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ABSTRACT This article explores the influence of mile Durkheim on the philosophy of 
Emmanuel Levinas in order both to open up the political significance of LevinasÕs 
thought and to develop more expansive meanings of moral and political community 
within education. Education was a central preoccupation for both thinkers: Durkheim 
saw secular education as the site for promoting the values of organic solidarity, while 
Levinas was throughout his professional life engaged in debates on Jewish education, 
and conceptualized ethical subjectivity as a condition of being taught. Durkheim has 
been accused of dissolving the moral into the social, and his view of education as a 
means of imparting a sense of civic republican values is sometimes seen as conservative, 
while LevinasÕs argument for an Ôunfounded foundationÕ for morality is sometimes seen 
as paralysing the impetus for concrete political action. Against these interpretations, I 
argue that their approaches present provocative challenges for conceptualizing the 
nature of the social, offering theoretical resources to deepen understanding of education 
as the site of an everyday ethics and a prophetic politics opening onto more compelling 
ideals for education than those dominant within standard educational discourses.  
 
 
In January 2011, the UK education minister at the time, Michael Gove, launched a review 
of the national curriculum for primary and secondary schools in England, provoking 
unease from teachers. His draft proposals for a new history curriculum were especially 
controversial. The issue, as Gurminder Bhambra (2013) notes, was the use of an ÔOur 
Island StoryÕ narrative. This recalls a history book for children written in 1905, 
examining British history only within the nationÕs geographical borders and neglecting 
the fact that at the time, the UK governed at least a quarter of the earthÕs land and over a 
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fifth of its population. The resistance of schoolteachers and historians to these proposals 
reflects a moral awareness that the representation of our collective past in education is 
central to the politics of the present, as a narrow vision of history can be associated with 
exclusionary social policies. Bhambra notes that this parochial vision of British history 
was being formulated at the same time as migrants are being increasingly scapegoated in 
British political discourse, citing a statement by a Liberal Democrat MP from the General 
Election campaign of 2010:  
 
WeÕre in danger of a lost generation Ð parents and grandparents worry about a 
future where their children canÕt repay student loans, canÕt find a decent job and 
donÕt have a sniff of a chance at getting on the housing ladder. Their concern about 
the knock-on effects of immigration is genuine and isnÕt racist (cited in ibid.).  
 
The suggestion in these words is that immigrants are the cause of these problems. What is 
not being said is that Ôit was a British government that brought in tuition fees and 
undercut access to higher education; it was a British government that undermined the 
unions and deregulated the labour market; and it was a British government that sold off 
council houses, didnÕt build any more, and thus allowed the pool of social housing to 
contractÕ (Bhambra 2013). 
 The political offensive against immigration can be seen as the thin end of a wedge 
undermining a cosmopolitan welcoming of plurality. Bhambra notes that prominent 
members of the Coalition government (the Justice Secretary, Chris Grayling, and the 
Home Secretary, Theresa May), for example, sought to challenge a central pillar of 
cosmopolitanism Ð the commitment to human rights demonstrated by participation in the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights Act Ð through lobbying for the 
UK to pull out of the court and the convention, in a move which members of their own 
party, such as the former justice secretary, Kenneth Clarke, described as undermining 
fundamental freedoms that are Ôat the heart of the idea of European civilisationÕ 
(Bhambra 2013). 
 This debate about how the teaching of history can be implicated in perpetuating 
an exclusionary politics raises fundamental moral questions about how we talk about and 
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enact the meaning of community and society within education. Bhambra argues that 
while any political community has to express itself as a ÔweÕ, that ÔweÕ can be imagined 
as including the Ôwaves of immigrantsÕ attacked by the coalition government: this Ômore 
expansive and inclusive ÒweÓÕ might Ôalso be conscious of the widening social and 
economic inequalities brought about by the abstractions of neoliberal policy. Our 
problem is not the disruption of the social fabric by immigrants and by the exercise of 
human rights, but the separation from common problems of a distant political class and 
their active denial of an inclusive public interestÕ (Bhambra 2013). 
 How might we express and enact this more expansive ÔweÕ within education? 
Much contemporary debate about education is framed in terms of economic utility, with 
questions about Ôthe goodÕ evacuated from public discourse. Yet this debate demonstrates 
an ethical concern about the exclusionary effects of a narrow-minded narrative of British 
history, and raises the importance of attending to the ways particular political and moral 
ideals are folded into the everyday language and contents of the curriculum. Reflection 
on the ethics of education has always been central to philosophy of education, but in the 
past decade, there has been a growing interest in Ôthe ethicalÕ from across the humanities 
and social sciences, and in broader public discourse. There are good reasons for this. In 
privileging private individual success and fulfilment, modern Western culture has shifted 
questions about what it means to live a good life out of public debate, so that within 
education, policy discussions are mostly framed around neoliberal logics of the 
marketplace, utility, competitiveness and efficiency. The financial crisis and subsequent 
years of economic scarcity have returned ethical questions to the forefront of public and 
academic agendas, forcing reflection on fundamental moral questions such as how 
seemingly scarce resources are to be allocated, and what forms of justice we hope for in 
our lives together.  
 Specific attention to the ethical has been something of a blindspot in social 
scientific theorizing. This may seem surprising, given that the founding theorists of the 
social sciences were preoccupied with exploring the nature of moral facts and values. 
Anthropologists have argued that it was in part DurkheimÕs identification of the moral 
law with society that inhibited examination of the ethical dimensions of society in 
anthropology (Laidlaw, 2002; Zigon, 2007). At the same time, although Emmanuel 
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LevinasÕs focus on ethics has influenced educational philosophy (e.g. Standish, 2007; 
Todd, 2008; Strhan, 2012) and other humanities disciplines, it has yet to fully permeate 
social scientific debates to deepen understanding of the ethical within everyday life.  
 This article speculates on DurkheimÕs influence on Levinas to open up reflection 
on how we understand the moral nature of social life and human subjectivity, and the 
political challenge of this. Most scholarship on Levinas has located his work too 
exclusively within the phenomenological tradition, and, as Howard Caygill argues,1 the 
price has been a loss of the political significance of his work. Durkheim has been accused 
of dissolving the moral into the social, and his educational focus on imparting civic 
republican values is sometimes seen as conservative. Against such interpretations, I will 
argue that reading their work together offers resources for deepening understanding of 
how we conceptualize social life and of education as the site of ethics. 
 
Levinas, Durkheim and Republican Modernity 
 
In his interviews with Philip Nemo, Levinas said of his education at Strasbourg that it 
was an Ôinitiation into the great philosophersÕ, but that Ôit was Durkheim and Bergson 
who seemed to me especially alive in the instruction and attention of the students. It was 
they whom one cited, and whom one opposedÕ (EI, p. 26). The university at that time was 
marked by the Ôprinciples of Õ89Õ2 Ð a radical republicanism, which meant that even in the 
most abstract philosophical analyses, attention to the relation between the principles of 
liberty, equality and fraternity were never far below the surface (Caygill, 2002, p. 7). This 
climate played an important part in determining LevinasÕs later engagements with 
phenomenology. Following the Dreyfus Affair,3 debates on the relations between these 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 My interpretation of the relation between Levinas and Durkheim throughout this article 
is significantly influenced by CaygillÕs brilliant Levinas and the Political (2002). 
2 These principles refer to the tradition of radical republicanism bequeathed by the French 
Revolution of 1789 (Caygill, 2002, p. 7). 
3 This refers to the public upheaval over the case of Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish 
French military officer who was unjustly convicted of treason by a military tribunal, and 
imprisoned on DevilÕs Island in French Guiana, where he spent five years. By 1898, the 
case had become a famous public affair, and many believed FranceÕs future as a 
democracy rested on the acquittal of Captain Dreyfus. 
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revolutionary principles had taken on a new intensity, provoking arguments on the 
Republican ideals which were still reverberating when Levinas arrived at Strasbourg in 
1923 (Caygill, 2002, p. 7). The Affair had a profound effect in shaping LevinasÕs politics, 
stimulating an ongoing desire to reinvigorate the secular trinity of French revolutionary 
values, especially in relation to fraternity.4 This was necessary after the anti-Dreyfusard 
Action Franaise and the Catholic Church had defined fraternity in narrow terms of 
national, religious and racial identifications: any new conceptualization had to protect 
against those excluded through such categorizations (p. 9). Rather than interpreting 
fraternity in its Jacobin formulation as an armed male nation, or through categories of 
identification such as race, class, or religion, Levinas was inspired by his teachers at 
Strasbourg to develop Ôan ethical concept of fraternity framed in terms of solidarity with 
the victim of injusticeÕ (p. 8).  
 As site of struggle for the meaning of French Republicanism, the Dreyfus Affair 
played an important role in LevinasÕs intellectual formation, and had decisively shaped 
DurkheimÕs sociological and political trajectory. Prior to the Affair, Durkheim had been 
developing a critique of classical liberalismÕs assumptions that society is comprised of 
disparate individuals pursuing private concerns. At the height of the Affair, as people 
took to the streets, waving flags and expressing creeds, he perceived a shared faith in 
civic republicanism or Ômoral individualismÕ being affirmed and deepened, and saw this 
as affirming a faith that people do not live for themselves alone, but for others (Cladis, 
2001, p. xv). In ÔIndividualism and the IntellectualsÕ, Durkheim argued that the moral 
individualism associated with liberalism is inseparable from fraternity, or Ôorganic 
solidarityÕ, which inspires a feeling of sacredness: Ôwhoever makes an attempt on a manÕs 
life, on a manÕs liberty É inspires in us a feeling of horror analogous in every way to that 
which the believer experiences when he sees his idol profaned. Such an ethic É is a 
religion in which man is at once the worshipper and the godÕ (1973, p. 46).  
 DurkheimÕs conception of Ôthe socialÕ was also to be a significant influence on 
Levinas. Levinas described the work of Durkheim as   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 The term ÔfraternityÕ is vulnerable to critique as a patriarchal idiom, however, as I will 
elaborate, LevinasÕs use of the term gestures more towards ideas of political friendship 
and community beginning in my responsibility, rather than necessarily signifying ideas of 
patriarchy. 
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an elaboration of the fundamental categories of the social, É beginning with the 
idea that the social does not reduce to the sum of individual psychologies. 
Durkheim, a metaphysician! The idea that the social is the very order of the 
spiritual, a new plot in being above the animal and human psychism; the level of 
Ôcollective representationsÕ defined with vigor and which opens up the dimension 
of spirit in the individual life itself, where the individual alone comes to be 
recognized and even redeemed. In Durkheim there is, in a sense, a theory of Ôlevels 
of being,Õ of the irreducibility of these levels to one another (EI, p. 26-7). 
    
For Levinas, DurkheimÕs understanding of the ÔsocialÕ opened up ontological difference, 
revealing the irreducibility of modes of being to each other. Against the view of his 
reducing the moral to the social, Durkheim, for Levinas, revealed the social precisely as 
the site of transcendence, elevating the very meaning of ÔsocietyÕ. LevinasÕs desire to 
reconceptualize human subjectivity as beginning in ethical responsibility takes up 
elements of this moral orientation of DurkheimÕs work. Human life, for both, begins from 
the social fact of our being-for-others, and this determines the nature of subjectivity as 
ethical. 
 DurkheimÕs argument that, in LevinasÕs words, Ôthe social is the order of the 
spiritualÕ, and that it is society that is venerated in religious rituals, is still, despite its 
familiarity, provocative. Society, Durkheim writes, Ôarouses in us a sensation of perpetual 
dependenceÕ, and we feel society as both ÔotherÕ than but also working through us, as it 
Ôcompels us to become its servants, forgetting our own interests, and compels us to 
endure all sorts of hardships, privations, and sacrifice without which social life would be 
impossibleÕ (2001, pp.154-5). This sensation of society as sacred shapes human 
subjectivity as fundamentally dividual. Durkheim argues that in our social condition of 
obligation towards others, we feel a moral call as expressing Ôsomething inside us other 
than ourselvesÕ (p. 193-4). Durkheim argued that with processes of modernization, as 
societies Ôexpand over vaster territories, traditions and practicesÕ (1973, p. 51), only a 
sense of the dignity of the human could be a primary source of solidarity, emerging not 
 7 
from any sense of sameness of persons or categories of identity, but in the sacredness of 
humanity and the sense of solidarity for the other who is the victim of injustice. 
 Durkheim saw education as the sphere where this moral solidarity could be 
deepened, and his 1902 lectures on moral education articulated a vision of the ethical as 
permeating the whole of education: Ôit is implicated in every moment. It must be mingled 
in the whole of school life, as morality itself is involved in the whole web of collective 
lifeÉ There is no formula that can contain and express it adequatelyÕ (cited in Cladis, 
1998, p. 21). Durkheim had in mind a new secular ethics of education, based on a sense 
of respect for the innate dignity of the human individual as the core value of modern 
society. While he saw the idea of the nation as important in citizenship education, the 
nation should also always to open to scrutiny, for example, in respect to the extent to 
which it promoted justice for those outside. The nation, for Durkheim, could enjoy moral 
primacy only on condition that its actions were constantly open to moral question, that it 
was not understood Ôas an unscrupulous self-centered being, solely preoccupied with 
expansion and self-aggrandizement to the detriment of similar entities; but as one of 
many agencies that must collaborate for the progressive realization of the conception of 
mankindÕ (cited in Bellah, 1973, p. xli).  
 In this brief sketch, we see that rather than reducing the moral to the social, 
Durkheim elevates the social to the moral, and develops a vision of modern societies as 
underpinned by a solidarity beginning not in conditions of sameness, but in recognition of 
the dignity of the other human, starting from compassion for the victim of injustice. How 
then do these ideas relate to LevinasÕs understanding of social life, and to his thinking on 
education? In the following section, let us consider how these ideas find expression in 
LevinasÕs thought. 
 
Justice, Society and Prophetic Politics   
 
LevinasÕs work is dominated by one far-reaching theme: that ethics is first philosophy. In 
Difficult Freedom, Levinas described his life as Ôa disparate inventory É dominated by 
the presentiment and memory of the Nazi horrorÕ (DF, p. 291): his conceptualization of 
human subjectivity, language and knowledge as beginning with ethics was determined by 
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his experience of National Socialism, both feared and mourned. LevinasÕs two major 
works - Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being - are works of mourning, reflected 
in the dedication of Otherwise than Being, in Ômemory of those who were closest among 
the six million assassinated by the National Socialists, and of the millions on millions of 
all confessions and all nations, victims of the same hatred of the other man, the same anti-
semitismÕ. The trajectory of LevinasÕs work was significantly shaped by his engagement 
with Heidegger. After Strasbourg, Levinas went to study with Husserl in Freiburg, but the 
approach he discovered in Husserl was, he stated, Ôtransfigured by HeideggerÕ (RB, p. 
32).5  Although his attraction to HeideggerÕs work was ended by HeideggerÕs 
commitment to National Socialism, this initial influence played a significant part in 
orientating the direction of LevinasÕs work, subsequently governed by Ôthe profound 
desire to leave the climate of that [HeideggerÕs] philosophyÕ (EE, p. 4). 
 The urgency of leaving Heideggerian philosophy is evident in LevinasÕs 
presentiments of the Nazi horror. His ÔReflections on the Philosophy of HitlerismÕ, 
published in 1934, described the Heideggerian ontology of the self as a precondition of 
National Socialism. Levinas described the article as motivated by the belief that Ôthe 
source of the bloody barbarism of National Socialism lies not in some contingent 
anomaly within human reasoning, nor in some accidental ideological misunderstandingÕ 
(RPH, p. 63). He summarized the article as identifying the source of Ôelemental Evil into 
which we can be led by logic and against which Western philosophy had not sufficiently 
insured itselfÕ as Ôinscribed within the ontology of a being concerned with beingÕ (p. 63). 
In this early writing, we see already the future direction of LevinasÕs work in this idea 
that the self-positing subject, concerned with its own being, Ôthe famous subject of a 
transcendental idealism that before all else wishes to be free and thinks itself freeÕ (p. 63), 
leads to the possibility of political violence.  
 This article reveals how LevinasÕs critique of Heidegger was influenced by 
Durkheim. As Caygill notes, LevinasÕs analysis of Hitlerism as an elaboration of an 
Ôelementary formÕ of evil, was informed by DurkheimÕs method of studying the 
Ôelementary formsÕ of religion a means of understanding the sacred in more complex 
modernized societies (Caygill, 2002, p. 31). Here, Levinas brings this approach together 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 See Strhan, 2012, pp. 4-20. 
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with phenomenology to explore the Ôelementary formsÕ and temporal structures of 
experience shaping Nazism and its oppositions in Christianity and liberalism. Levinas 
argues that in Nazism, as an Ôelementary formÕ of pagan religion, the past is a fait 
accompli that weighs heavily on human destiny, as both present and future repeat a past 
that can only be endured (Caygill, 2002, p. 33). Levinas argues that true freedom requires 
a true present, offered by Jewish and Christian temporalities with their dramas of 
repentance and redemption, in which there is Ôa continuous opening on to the futureÕ (p. 
33).  
 Responsibility is intrinsic to this understanding of freedom, and equality here is 
rooted in the liberatory potential of monotheism. LevinasÕs primary concern is to derive 
equality from freedom, in order to defend it from fascist conceptions of racial inequality. 
This, as Caygill notes, is a thread Levinas develops in later writings, using the notion of 
freedom both to criticize any notion of fate (whether rooted in racial philosophies of 
history or natural history) and then to justify equality. In absolute freedom, the individual 
is Ôliberated É from any determination be it natural (racial) or historical (political or 
confessional)Õ (Caygill, 2002, p. 34), so that the equal dignity of each human, as 
emphasized by Durkheim, is justified not through material or social conditions, but 
through Ôthe power given to the soul to free itself from what has been, from everything 
that linked it with something or engaged it with somethingÕ (RPH, p. 66).  
 Levinas criticizes liberalism as unable to protect the dignity of the human subject, 
since it depends on a self-positing, autonomous subject. As Durkheim had earlier 
challenged individualistic conceptions of liberalism through showing human subjectivity 
as shaped through a primary moral obligation, so Levinas questions whether liberalism 
Ôis all we needÕ to Ôachieve an authentic dignity for the human subject. Does the subject 
arrive at the human condition prior to assuming responsibility for the other man É ?Õ 
(RPH, p. 63). Levinas describes liberalism as accepting a radical concept of freedom, 
with reason the source of freedom, located Ôoutside the brutal world and the implacable 
history of concrete existenceÕ (p. 66). This reign of reason, beginning in the 
Enlightenment, displaces the redemptive time of Christianity, so that Ôin place of 
liberation through grace, there is autonomyÕ (p. 66). Levinas argues that this autonomy, 
without a shared drama of repentance and redemption, fails to offer a basis for 
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community or social life, making liberalism vulnerable to suggestions for ÔcommunityÕ or 
ÔfraternityÕ opposed to freedom or equality, Ôsuch as the national, confessional, class and, 
more ominously, racial fraternities that pervade modernity and are able through their own 
dramatic narratives of repentance and redemption to exploit the deficit of liberal 
rationalismÕ (Caygill, 2002, p. 35).  
 ÔReflections on the Philosophy of HitlerismÕ reveals how LevinasÕs approach was 
influenced by Durkheim from this early period. Developing this, in Totality and Infinity, 
LevinasÕs critique extends beyond Heidegger to interrogate the entire Western 
philosophical tradition. The terms ÔtotalityÕ and ÔinfinityÕ draw a contrast between a 
totalizing ontological approach and an ethical relation of infinitude. LevinasÕs central 
argument is that if our relations with others are conceived in terms of comprehension, 
recognition or equality, then insofar as this mode of relationality aims to bring the other 
within the domain of my understanding, it is totalizing. This idea of taking over the other, 
and the endless capacities of Western thought to do this, is central to LevinasÕs 
philosophy, and has relevance beyond the horizons he identified. Robert Eaglestone notes 
that colonial projects have been based on this logic of Ôannexation, of conquering, which 
means consuming otherness and revising it as ÒsamenessÓ (2010, p. 64). As today such 
exploitative modes of relationality continue by other means, LevinasÕs thought Ôis a way 
of exposing, from within, the colonial and ÒomnivorousÓ powers of Western thoughtÕ 
(Eaglestone, 2010, p. 64). Today, this totalizing impulse can also be seen in 
dehumanizing discourses of accumulation, performativity and productivity that pervade 
education, in which the singularity of the other is subsumed as they are measured 
according to their capacity for production.  
 Levinas describes the relation between self and other that interrupts this totalizing 
relation as taking place in language: the site of totality and infinity. Describing 
responsibility (as responsivity) as a precondition of language, Levinas anchors the 
structure of logical thought in this ethical relation to the other, even if this always carries 
with it the possibility of totalization. Levinas uses an image of a teacher to evoke this 
ethical relation between self and other: to be taught is to be summoned into a non-violent 
relation with the other, who remains beyond my knowing in a position of magisterial 
height: ÔThe height from which language comes we designate with the term teachingÉ 
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This voice coming from another shore teaches transcendence itself. Teaching signifies the 
whole infinity of exteriorityÕ (TI, p. 271).  
 For Levinas, it is only in being taught that meaning, truth and subjectivity are 
possible, and these come to me from beyond Ð even as they are within - myself and shape 
the conditions of my subjectivity as dividual, as Durkheim had earlier argued. Through 
this teaching, a common social world is created: ÔTo speak is to make the world common, 
to create commonplaces. Language does not refer to the generality of concepts, but lays 
the foundation for a possession in commonÕ (TI, p. 76). This teaching founds objectivity 
and reason, which is the result of putting things in question between self and other. As 
Alphonso Lingis puts this: 
 
The other turns and speaks; he or she asks something of me. Her words, which I 
understand because they are the words of my own tongue, ask for information and 
indications. They ask for a response that will be responsible, will give reasons for 
its reasons and will be a commitment to answer for what it answers. But they first 
greet me with an appeal for responsiveness. (1994, pp. 130-1). 
 
As for Durkheim, society and rationality are possible through a condition of moral 
obligation, Levinas likewise opens up the ethical conditions of subjectivity, society, and 
reason. 
 Levinas, however, deepens the nature of this responsibility. For Durkheim, it is 
possible to understand the subjectÕs obligation towards others as what Stanley Cavell 
describes as a Ôhorizontal form of lifeÕ (1996). Cavell uses this phrase to allude to an 
interpretation of WittgensteinÕs use of the phrase Ôform of lifeÕ in a conventionalist sense, 
to refer to human beings agreeing with each other in the language they use, as Ôsome kind 
of contract or an implicitly or explicitly agreed upon set of rulesÕ (Cavell, 1996, p. 328). 
For Durkheim, the subjectÕs sense of moral obligation towards others might be seen in 
such terms, as a reciprocal responsibility, rooted in the experience of being part of a 
social collective. For Levinas, the ethical dividualism of the subject might be seen instead 
in terms of a Ôvertical form of lifeÕ (Cavell, 1996, p. 328). In this, what is at issue are Ônot 
alone differences between promising and fully intending, or between coronations and 
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inaugurations, or between barter and a credit systemÉ; these are differences within the 
plane, the horizon, of the social, of human societyÕ (p. 329). While Levinas saw 
DurkheimÕs conception of Ôthe socialÕ as opening up ontological difference, his own 
work deepens this, with subjectivity and society beginning not in a reciprocal form of 
life, but in the verticality of human responsibility.  
 Cavell suggests that our becoming disappointed with criteria, indeed with 
language as such, is a consequence of this vertical form of life, of the singularity and 
separateness of my experience, which is the condition of human subjectivity: Ônot a 
particular fact or power but the fact that I am a man, therefore of this (range or scale of) 
capacity for work, for pleasure, for endurance, for appeal, for command, for 
understanding, for wish, for will, for teaching, for sufferingÕ (p. 330). For Levinas, it is 
the responsibility of subjectivity that confirms the singularity of the subject, and the 
vertiginous height of this orientation towards the other interrupts and leaves us 
disappointed with categories of identification. This takes us somewhat beyond 
DurkheimÕs organic solidarity. Levinas emphasizes that this inescapable responsibility 
deepens the more I choose to answer it, and while I may ignore it, I cannot escape the call 
by which I am singularly addressed: ÔTo utter ÔIÕ, to affirm the irreducible singularity in 
which the apology is pursued, means to possess a privileged place with regard to 
responsibilities for which no one can replace me and from which no one can release meÕ 
(TI, p. 245).  
 Although Levinas focuses on the relationship between I and other to draw 
attention to the nature of singularity (the responsibility that begins in me, that confirms 
my uniqueness), within everyday social life, this is not a party of two. The third party is 
always present in the otherÕs address, demanding justice and justification for how I 
respond to many others. The ethical is therefore always already inseparable from the 
political, as the third interrupts the asymmetry of responsibility, demanding justice (TI, p. 
213). Levinas develops this line of thought in Otherwise than Being, with society 
founded not on equality or commonality, but on a community of others, each unique and 
resisting reduction to classification. This deepens DurkheimÕs understanding of the social 
as founded in the experience of obligation for others, but resisting DurkheimÕs emphasis 
on fusion in the ecstatic moment of worship. LevinasÕs emphasis on the singularity and 
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separateness of the subject indexes the unknowability of the other, allowing a more 
expansive understanding of community and society beginning in this fundamental 
condition of difference and ethical responsibility for the other.  
 Levinas posits this notion of justice associated with the third as maintaining the 
selfÕs infinite responsibility, but balanced against working out the conditions of justice 
for all the others. Caygill argues that this position is limited: Levinas ends up 
unexpectedly insisting on the priority of the relation to the other over the third, to prevent 
the otherÕs absorption into the totality (Caygill, 2002, p. 142), leaving the possibility of 
violence against the third party in the name of the other. Caygill however considers the 
possibility of the reverse of this position, in which all thirds become others, and suggests 
that this more compelling vision for justice is provided through the concepts of fraternity 
and illeity (p. 143). 
 Levinas uses the concept ÔilleityÕ to signify Ôthe Infinite that escapes the 
objectification of thematization and of dialogue É in the third personÕ (OB, p. 150). 
Illeity is not only a third between self and neighbor, but a third between immanence and 
transcendence that hollows out the distance between self and neighbor while always 
exceeding the terms of any relation (Caygill, 2002, p. 147; Strhan, 2012, p. 154). With 
illeity, Levinas refuses Durkheimian fusion and deepens the ethical possibilities of 
subjectivity through instead emphasizing the space of separation between self and other. 
In a dense passage, Levinas describes how the self finds within itself the infinite demand 
addressed to me by the other, in having already been obedient to their order: 
 
The inscription of the order in the for-the-other of obedience is an anarchic being 
affected, which slips into me Ôlike a thiefÕ through the outstretched nets of 
consciousness. This trauma has surprised me completely; the order has never been 
presented É to the point that it is I that only says, and after the event, this unheard-
of obligation. This ambivalence is the exception and subjectivity of the subject, its 
very psyche, a possibility of inspiration. It is the possibility of being the author of 
what had been breathed in unbeknownst to me, of having received, one knows not 
from where, that of which I am author. In the responsibility for the other we are at 
the heart of the ambiguity of inspiration. The unheard-of saying is enigmatically in 
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the anarchic response, in my responsibility for the other. The trace of infinity is this 
ambiguity in the subject, in turns beginning and makeshift, a diachronic 
ambivalence which ethics makes possible. (OB, p. 148-9) 
 
Caygill suggests that this voice heard in the command might be the voice of the third, 
overturning the priority of the other. This gestures towards a Ôprophetic politicsÕ, rooted 
in fraternity: 
 
Prophetic politics opens the possibility for a notion of justice as perpetual 
interruption, of the self by the other and of the other by the third. The third in 
question here, and the justice to which it gives rise, is not the third of the state and 
its justice thought of in terms of equivalence and measure, but the third thought of 
in terms of divinity and in the divine approbation of human fraternity. (Caygill, 
2002, p. 150). 
 
Levinas describes the other as also my brother, and states that it is impossible to deny 
fraternity (OB, p. 150), suggesting a prophetic understanding of community beginning 
with the condition of fraternity conceived in terms of responsibility, rather than sameness 
or fusion. This fraternity is bound up with the separation of illeity: ÔIt is not because the 
neighbor would be recognized as belonging to the same genus as me that he concerns me. 
He is precisely other. The community with him begins in my obligation to himÉ A 
fraternity that cannot be abrogated, an unimpeachable assignationÕ (p. 87).  
 For Levinas, this responsibility to the other and all the others is found first of all 
in my condition of being taught by the other, through whom I receive language and the 
uniqueness of my subjectivity. This responsibility, deepening the more I attend to it, is 
always there, and Levinas prophetically invites his reader to attend to it, to bring about a 
more just society, rooted in responsibility for all the others, in which my obligations to 
those close by are structured by my relations to all the others.  
 DurkheimÕs focus on the ritualization of the sacred emphasizes the experiential 
qualities through which moral sensibilities are inculcated, yet Levinas draws this intuition 
into the realm of the everyday: this is not a matter of peak experiences, or of ÔexperienceÕ 
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at all, but a condition of responsibility that is present as a possibility to be realized in 
every interaction. As Standish questions, what do we do Ôthat does not involve this 
responsibility Ð neglected or covered over though that usually is. If the obligation to the 
Other should be seen as pervasive, the things that we interact with and the way we word 
the world should be seen in this light (2007, pp. 79-80). Although this responsibility 
extends to our responsibilities for all, it is there in the most mundane of interactions, 
Ôeven the simple, ÒAfter you, sirÓ É [This is] not the limit case of solidarity, but the 
condition for all solidarityÕ (OB, p. 117). For Levinas, society depends not on any notion 
of truth or knowledge, but on this. Criticizing the Platonic subordination of justice to 
truth, he argues, ÔSociety does not proceed from the contemplation of the true; truth is 
made possible by relation with the OtherÉ Truth is thus bound up with the social 
relation, which is justiceÕ (TI, p. 72).  
 As Durkheim was engaged in debates about French education, so Levinas spent 
most of his professional life as a school administrator and teacher. From 1945-1979, 
Levinas was Director of the cole Normale Isralite Orientale, a work he described as Ôa 
callingÕ, in a school training teachers to work in the Mediterranean region, working Ôfor 
the emancipation of Jews in those countries where they still did not have the right to 
citizenshipÕ (RB, p. 38). Although sometimes criticized as relegating ethics to an 
otherworldly order, LevinasÕs conception of responsibility as working for an always 
better justice was something he was concretely working out in his own life in the domain 
of education. His comments on pedagogical demands he experienced at the ENIO can be 
connected with his conceptualization of subjectivity as a deepening responsibility: 
 
Will my life have been spent between the incessant presentiment of Hitlerism and 
the Hitlerism that refuses itself to any forgetting? Not everything related in my 
thoughts to the destiny of Judaism, but my activity at the Alliance kept me in 
contact with the Jewish ordeal, bringing me back to the concrete social and political 
problems which concerned it everywhere. In Europe, outside of the Mediterranean 
region of the schools of the Alliance: notably in Poland, where the proximity of a 
hostile Germany nevertheless remained anti-Semitic instincts barely put to sleep. 
Concrete problems with spiritual repercussions. Facts that are always enormous. 
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Thoughts coming back to ancient and venerable texts, always enigmatic, always 
disproportionate to the exegeses of a school. Here you have, in administrative and 
pedagogical problems, invitations to a deepening, to a becoming conscience, that is, 
to Scripture. (RB, p. 39) 
 
However, although this deepening responsibility invites concrete action to work towards 
a better justice, this does not mean that any programmatic application of his thought to 
education follows (Todd, 2008, p. 182). While Durkheim developed an approach to moral 
education for schools to deepen social solidarity, Levinas leaves radically open the 
question of how to deepen the ethical possibilities that are already implied in our 
everyday educational worlds. 
 
Discussion: Towards an Everyday Ethics of Education 
 
Reading Levinas with Durkheim shows the extent to which Levinas was concerned with 
taking up the challenge he had encountered in DurkheimÕs thought to revitalize political 
principles. It also invites us to reconsider DurkheimÕs metaphysics of the social, in which 
the social is elevated to the transcendent rather than the moral dissolved into the social. 
There are significant differences between their approaches, most pointedly in relation to 
the singularity of subjectivity. Yet their conceptions of education - rooted in a sense of of 
social life as beginning with ethics - demonstrates the narrowness of totalizing 
educational discourses in which, for example, education is treated as a service that can be 
delivered to consumers in an educational marketplace, a domain of increasingly 
conceived in terms of privatized choice rather than public good.   
 There are limitations to their approaches. DurkheimÕs patriotism sounds a 
paternalistic note, and his duality of sacred and profane and desire to create a moral 
community always run the risk of exclusion. The contemporary resonance of this was 
powerfully suggested in responses to the attack on the French magazine Charlie Hebdo in 
January 2015, as the sacralizing of Ôfree speechÕ symbolized in the ÔJe Suis CharlieÕ 
slogans reverberating on social media and on demonstratorsÕ placards were experienced 
by many as perpetuating an exclusionary logic against those unable to express solidarity 
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with the satirical magazine.6 LevinasÕs own political refusals of responsibility and justice 
are also well documented (Strhan, 2012, p. 164). But these risks of exclusion and 
totalization should invite our attention to our own need for vigilance against becoming 
immunized against othersÕ needs and to work to resist deafness to the address of those 
both within and beyond our communities. Responsibility is to those nearby. But it is also 
for those far away who are affected by our actions in an increasingly globalized world, 
and the notions of ÔIÕ and ÔweÕ that we voice within education might enable a more 
expansive political imaginary and deepen desire for educational communities that are 
bound together with an orientation of responsibility towards those within and beyond 
them, a desire to welcome and to protect the other that challenges the exclusionary logics 
that are today increasingly sounding again, as far-right political parties grow in 
prominence across Europe and elsewhere.  
 Levinas shows us how the resources for a more ethical thinking are already 
present in our engagements with others in education, and shows us that dehumanizing 
logics of productivity, or historical narratives perpetuating an exclusionary political 
vision of ÔcommunityÕ are never the whole story. Students and teachers in responding to 
each other with responses that are responsible, or in the curriculum choices they make 
about which stories they tell about the possibilities of a more just society, are already 
showing how our practices and words can bear witness to an everyday ethics that is also 
achieved, even if that achievement is also always fragile, threatened by the risk of refusal 
to acknowledge some part of the community (for example, minority groups) as an 
integral part of it.  
 Levinas and Durkheim both invite us to be more attentive to the moral 
possibilities that are already implied in everyday educational practices, inviting a 
prophetic politics of radical inclusion. Their commitments to the human and to education 
as fundamentally moral are imbued with a hopefulness in the possibility of change. 
Vaclav Havel describes how he was influenced by LevinasÕs notion of responsibility, this 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 See, for example, discussion in https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-
it/cas-mudde/no-we-are-not-all-charlie-and-that%E2%80%99s-problem (accessed 16 
February 2015). 
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idea that Ôsomething must beginÕ, that we should have greater faith in the potential 
significance of our everyday actions: 
 
You have certainly heard of the Ôbutterfly effectÕ. It is a belief that everything in the 
world is so mysteriously and completely interconnected that a slight, seemingly 
insignificant wave of a butterflyÕs wings in a single spot on this planet can unleash 
a typhoon thousands of miles away. 
 
I think we must believe in this effect for politics. We cannot assume that our 
microscopic yet truly unique everyday actions are of no consequence simply 
because they cannot resolve the immense problems of today. That would be an a 
priori nihilistic assertion, and an expression of the arrogant, modern rationality that 
believes it knows how the world works. (cited in Edgoose, 2008, p. 111) 
 
Levinas and Durkheim encourage us to attend to the everyday moral landscapes of 
education that we exist within, and to be aware that it is through our actions that such 
landscapes are re-created. We may feel subjected to social forces beyond our control, but 
that social realm is also shaped and made possible through our words and responses to 
each other. We can hope that our actions and words matter in the work of creating a 
better justice. We can find ways of resisting unjust words, practices, and the colonization 
of our thinking about education in totalizing rhetorics, whether in dehumanizing logics of 
efficiency, or in terms of social exclusion. Our actions and the words we speak, as 
teachers and students, have a political and ethical power that exceeds our intentions or 
knowledge, and Levinas and Durkheim witness to that fact, encouraging us to be vigilant 
that our educational practices enact a more humane society.  
 
Word count: 6966 
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DF Difficult Freedom 
EI Ethics and Infinity 
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OB Otherwise than Being 
RB  Is It Righteous to Be? 
RPH Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism 
TI Totality and Infinity 
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